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DOES THE SUPREME COURT'S BURLINGTON NORTHERN 
DECISION REQUIRE RECONSIDERATION OF THE ACETO 
LINE OF "ARRANGER" LIABILITY CASES? 
Aaron Gershonowitzt 
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and 
Liability Act of 1980 1 (CERCLA or the Superfund Law) states that a 
person who "arranged for disposal" of hazardous substances may be 
liable for remediation costs at an inactive hazardous waste site. 2 
Courts have generally interpreted "arranged for disposal" broadly to 
include anyone who had responsibility for the hazardous substances. 3 
The Eighth Circuit's decision in United States v. Aceto Agricultural 
Chemicals Corp.4 represents perhaps the most expansive reading of 
arranger liability, holding that a corporation can be liable even 
though the corporation never possessed the waste and made no 
decisions regarding disposal. 5 The Aceto theory of arranger liability 
has been followed by several other federal circuit courts of appeals. 6 
In Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. United States 
(Burlington Northern),7 the Supreme Court addressed an arranger 
liability issue that is, on its face, unrelated to the Aceto line of cases. 
The issue was whether a seller of chemicals could be held liable as an 
arranger when chemicals it sold accidentally spilled on delivery. 8 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the seller could be liable 
as an arranger. 9 The Supreme Court reversed, and limited arranger 
t Partner, Forchelli, Curto, Crowe, Deegan, Schwartz, Mineo & Cohn LLP, Uniondale, 
New York. Adjunct Faculty, University of Phoenix Online Campus. 
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2006). 
2. ld. § 9607(a)(3) (imposing liability on "any person who by contract, agreement, or 
otherwise arranged for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for 
transport for disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by 
such person, by any other party or entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned 
or operated by another party or entity and containing such hazardous substances"). 
3. See. e.g., United States v. Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373 (8th Cir. 1989). 
4. Id. 
5. See infra Part II (discussing the Aceto decision). 
6. See infra Part I1.B (discussing the court of appeals decisions that have followed the 
Aceto theory ofliability). 
7. 129 S. Ct. 1870 (2009). 
8. Id. at 1878. 
9. United States v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 520 F.3d 918, 930 (9th Cir. 2008). 
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liability to actions intended to dispose of hazardous substances 
because "arrange" means to make a plan, and one cannot make a plan 
accidentally. 10 
This article will assess whether the Court's reasoning in Burlington 
Northern limits the scope of arranger liability so much that the Aceto 
line cannot survive. In particular, it will examine whether the 
Burlington Northern Court meant that all arrangers must intend to 
arrange for disposal or whether the decision should be read more 
narrowly to conclude that a seller of a useful non-waste product can 
only be liable as an arranger ifhe or she intends a disposal. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Development of the Arranger Concept 
The Superfund Law does not define arrange or include any 
discussion of what it means to arrange for disposal. 11 There is no 
legislative history directly addressing the meaning of arranger 
liability.12 The only legislative history that might suggest a meaning 
for the arranger concept is the legislative history that identifies the 
concepts Congress discussed, rejected, and replaced with the arranger 
concept. 13 
One bill that preceded the Superfund Law provided that a waste 
generator is liable for remediation costs. 14 Generator, unlike 
arranger, was a familiar environmental law concept because the 
10. Burlington N., 129 S. Ct. at 1879. 
11. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601, 9607 (2006). 
12. A number of courts have noted that CERCLA was hurriedly put together and passed 
with very little debate so that the legislative history provides little help in 
understanding the phrase. See, e.g., United States v. Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 
F.2d 1373, 1380 (8th Cir. 1989); New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 
1039-40 (2d Cir. 1985). 
13. See ALLAN J. TOPOL & REBECCA SNOW, SUPERFUND LAW AND PROCEDURE § 1.1, at 4-
5 (West Publ'g Co. 1992) (,,[T]here are no committee or conference reports 
addressing the version of the legislation that ultimately became law" and "reports 
pertaining to the prior version of the legislation are of little value. "); see also Frank P. 
Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation and Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 1 
(1982); Developments in the Law: Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 HARv. L. REV. 1458, 
1465-66 (1985-1986) [hereinafter Developments in the Law]. 
14. See H.R. REp. No. 96-1016, pt. 1, at 29 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 
6132 ("Subsection (b) [of section 3041] defines the term 'responsible party' to mean 
any person who ... generated or disposed of a substantial portion of the hazardous 
waste treated, stored or disposed of at the inactive site."). 
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Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)15 already imposed 
significant waste management obligations on the waste generator. 16 
A competing bill did not impose liability on generators or arrangers, 
but instead used a causation concept-the person who caused or 
contributed to the contamination would be liable for the cleanup 
costs. 17 
Because the debate between generator liability and causation 
liability seems to have resulted in arranger liability, a closer look at 
those concepts may shed light on the intended scope of arranger 
liability. The primary difference between RCRA and CERCLA is 
that RCRA regulates hazardous waste activities 18 while CERCLA 
provides a liability system for inactive hazardous sites-places where 
waste was disposed of in the past. 19 The key regulated party under 
RCRA is the waste generator. 20 Anyone who has a manufacturing or 
industrial process that results in the creation of hazardous waste is the 
generator of that waste, and RCRA tells that person how to store, 
handle, and dispose of hazardous waste. 21 CERCLA, on the other 
hand, describes how to clean up inactive hazardous waste sites22 and 
15. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (2006). Generator is defined in § 6903(6). 
16. ld. § 6922 (discussing standards for generators of hazardous waste). 
17. H.R. REP. No. 96-1016, pt. 1, at 14-15,68 (stating that basing liability on causation 
would be more fair than imposing liability on generators because mere generation of 
waste does not cause a release to the environment). 
18. 42 U.S.c. §§ 6921-693ge (dealing with hazardous waste management). See § 6921 
for the definition of hazardous waste, § 6922 for standards for generators of hazardous 
waste, and § 6923 for standards for owners and operators of hazardous waste 
treatment, storage and disposal facilities. 
19. See Sen. Robert T. Stafford, Why Superfund Was Needed, 7 EPA J. 8, 9-10 (1981) 
(discussing the goals ofCERCLA); see also TOPOL & SNOW, supra note 13, § 2.1, at 
24-25 (noting that Superfund primarily addresses present conditions that are the result 
of past acts). 
20. See 40 C.F .R. § 262 (2010). RCRA generators must identify which of their wastes are 
hazardous, see id. § 261 (addressing waste identification), handle them in a manner 
that reduces exposure, see id. § 262, pt. C (addressing packaging, labeling, and other 
pre-transport requirements), and document proper disposal, see id. § 262, pt. B 
(dealing with waste tracking). 
21. See 42 U.S.C § 6903(6) (defining "hazardous waste generation" as "the act or process 
of producing hazardous waste"); id. § 6992(a). 
22. Id. § 9605 (requiring the preparation of a National Contingency Plan that "shall 
establish procedures and standards for responding to releases of hazardous 
substances"). 
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states who can be held liable for the cleanup costS. 23 It does not 
regulate business activities. 24 
With that difference in mind, Congress considered whether the 
person with the waste handling and disposal obligations under RCRA 
should also be a person who is liable for the remediation of inactive 
hazardous waste sites. 25 The generator was a good candidate for 
liability for several reasons. If liability was to be imposed on those 
who benefited economically from the disposal of the waste, the 
generator fit the bill because it engaged in the business activity that 
created the waste. 26 If the liability system was intended to serve as a 
deterrent to the creation of new inactive hazardous waste sites, 
making the generator a liable party also made sense because the 
generator is the first person to have control of the waste and therefore 
has the ability to control how to dispose of the waste. 27 
The alternative considered by Congress followed more of a tort 
model that imposed liability on all who caused or contributed to the 
contamination without regard to how the waste came into existence. 28 
If the problem being addressed by Congress was the presence of 
inactive hazardous waste sites,29 it made sense to place responsibility 
for the problem on those who caused the existence of the inactive 
hazardous waste sites. 30 Tort law has long provided strict liability for 
those involved in ultra-hazardous or unreasonably dangerous 
activities. 31 Some courts have included the handling of hazardous 
substances as such an activity. 32 Thus, liability for all who cause or 
23. Id. § 9607 (describing who can be liable for the costs of responding to the release of 
hazardous substances). 
24. See Lewis M. Barr, CERCLA Made Simple: An Analysis of the Cases Under the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980,45 
Bus. LAW. 923, 924 (1989-1990) (stating that CERCLA authorizes governments and 
private parties to cleanup toxic substances and recover their costs). 
25. Keith M. Lyons, Jr., Comment, Everyone Pays to Clean Up America: A Discussion of 
CERCLA Section J07(a)(3) and the Term "Arrangedfor Disposal," 28 W1LLAMETTE 
L. REv. 589, 597 (1992). 
26. See United States v. Ne. Phann. & Chern. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 732-34 (8th Cir. 1986) 
(discussing the legislative history of CERCLA and stating that Congress intended to 
impose the costs pn "those parties who created and profited from the sites"). 
27. See Ohio ex rei. Brown v. Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. 1300, 1312 (N.D. Ohio 1983). 
28. Ne. Pharm. & Chern. Co., 810 F.2d at 733 (noting that Congress imposed liability 
"upon those who created and profited from the sites"). 
29. See Stafford, supra note 19, at 9; see also Lyons, supra note 25, at 597. 
30. United States v. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064, 1072 (D. Colo. 1985). 
31. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 519,520,520 cmt. h (1976). 
32. See, e.g., Yommer v. McKenzie 255 Md. 220, 257 A.2d 138 (1969) (storage of 
flammable materials); Luthringer v. Moore, 190 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948) (cyanide gas). 
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contribute to the contamination at an inactive hazardous waste site 
would not have been a significant change in existing law. 33 
Both the generator and causation concepts are inadequate for the 
job intended by Congress. Generator is too limited a concept because 
Congress decided not to limit the Superfund Law to remediation of 
hazardous waste. 34 Many of the sites that needed to be cleaned up 
were contaminated with hazardous substances that might not meet the 
RCRA definition of hazardous waste. 35 Because the RCRA generator 
concept relates to waste and not to substances, generator was too 
limited a concept to describe all of the persons that Congress 
intended to be liable for remediation costS.36 
While the generator concept was too limited because it did not 
include all the types of sites Congress intended to address, it may also 
have been too broad from a fairness perspective. 37 If a company 
generated the waste but played no role in the decision to dispose of it 
at a particular facility, should they have liability? For example, 
Company A generates waste, which it determines can be reused, and 
it sells the waste to Company B, who intends to reuse it. Company B 
reuses some of it and disposes of the rest. Is there any reason that 
Company A, the waste generator, should be responsible for Company 
B's disposal?38 
Causation was a familiar tort concept and a logical candidate for 
the source of liability. 39 If the goal is to determine who should clean 
33. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 519,520,520 cmt. h (1976). 
34. CERCLA uses the phrase "hazardous substances," and the definition of hazardous 
substance includes hazardous waste as a subset of hazardous substance. 42 U.S.C. § 
9601(14) (2006). 
35. The RCRA regulations identify many hazardous wastes based on the process that 
created them. See 40 C.F.R. § 26l.32 (2010). At many inactive hazardous waste 
sites, there was a mixture of substances whose origin or prior use was difficult to 
determine. See United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 260-61 (3d 
Cir. 1992). Additionally, spills or releases of virgin chemicals (not waste) could 
create the same dangers as hazardous waste. See id. Thus, the need to clean up a 
mess should not be dependent on whether the mess is hazardous waste. See id. 
(discussing Congress's intent regarding the difference between hazardous waste and 
hazardous substances). 
36. See A/can, 964 F.2d at 260 (discussing Congress's intent regarding why the CERCLA 
definition of hazardous substances is broader than the RCRA definition of hazardous 
waste). 
37. See H.R. REp. No. 96-1016, pt. 1, at 68 (1980). 
38. See id. (stating that basing liability on "causation" would be fairer because "[t]he mere 
fact of generating a hazardous waste should not make the generator liable" for its 
release). 
39. See id. 
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up the mess, then how the mess was created is very important. 
Indeed, one could make the case that how the waste got there is more 
important to the liability issue than who created the waste. 40 The 
focus on causation, however, suggests that the person is liable 
because they have done something wrong. Congress was careful not 
to base Superfund Law liability on the notion of wrongdoing. 41 For 
example, the owner and operator of the facility are liable for 
remediation costs without regard to whether they ever had anything 
to do with hazardous substances. 42 Additionally, most of the 
hazardous substances that needed to be remediated were disposed of 
legally. 43 The responsible parties were often engaged in the ordinary 
course of business at a time when environmental regulations did not 
exist. 44 Congress did not want to indicate that what most 
corporations were doing was tortious. 45 Therefore, they set up a 
system of liability without fault-the message is that the waste has to 
be cleaned up regardless of how it got there. 
The bill that became the Superfund Law did not contain generator 
liability and did not provide for liability based on causation.46 
Instead, it contained this arranger concept. 47 As one court described 
it, "Congress did not, to say the least, leave the flood lights on to 
illuminate the trail to the intended meaning of arranger status.,,48 
Nevertheless, the arranger concept is generally seen as some 
40. See id. at 69. 
41. See TOPOL & SNOW, supra note 13, § 4.2, at 337-38 (stating that courts have 
"unanimously concluded that the appropriate standard under CERCLA is strict 
liability," citing two pages worth of cases). 
42. See 42 U.S.C § 9607(a)(l) (2006) (providing liability for the "owner or operator of a 
vessel or facility"); id. § 9607(a)(2) (providing liability for "any person who at the 
time of disposal of any hazardous substance[s] owned or operated any facility at 
which such substances were disposed of'). 
43. See Developments in the Law, supra note 13, at 1467-70 (describing the lack of 
federal regulation over hazardous waste disposal until the risks associated with 
improper disposal became evident in the 1960s and 1970s). 
44. See id. at 1462 (discussing the creation and disposal of hazardous waste by various 
industries prior to the enactment of CERCLA). 
45. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (imposing liability without fault). 
46. See id. For an explanation of how new concepts could be found in the final version 
without explanation, see TOPOL & SNOW, supra note 13, § 1.1, at 5 (describing "last 
minute, unrecorded compromises and acceptance of deliberate ambiguity in some of 
the bill's more controversial provisions"); see also United States v. Price, 577 F. 
Supp. 1103, 1109 (D.NJ. 1983) ("Even the legislative history must be read with 
caution since last minute changes in the bill were inserted with little or no 
explanation. "). 
47. 42 U.S.c. § 9607(a)(3). 
48. United States v. New Castle Cnty., 727 F. Supp. 854, 871 (D. Del. 1989). 
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combination of the generator and causation concepts. 49 When a 
person causes waste to be disposed of, the person has arranged for 
disposal of the waste. Similarly, because RCRA defines waste as 
something that is to be discarded, once hazardous waste is generated, 
there is little one can do with it other than arrange to have it 
discarded; when you arrange to have it discarded, you have arranged 
for its disposal. 50 
B. Early Arranger Cases Emphasized Generator Status Over 
Causation 
The early arranger cases were primarily generator cases. It quickly 
became clear that generators of hazardous waste are liable as 
arrangers. 51 Indeed, the early cases discuss generator liability as if 
the statute said generator instead of arranger. 52 Among the issues that 
were litigated were several that addressed whether one could be liable 
as an arranger without having caused or contributed to the 
contamination or the cleanup costs. 53 
In United States v. Wade,54 for example, generator defendants 
argued that to prove arranger liability, the Government needed to 
prove that a defendant's disposal of waste at the site caused the 
incurrence of cleanup costs. 55 The defendants relied heavily on the 
legislative history of the bill that would have based liability on 
49. See Aaron Gershonowitz, Superfund "Arranger" Liability: Why Ownership of the 
Hazardous Substances Matters, 59 S.C. L. REv. 147, 154 (2007) (discussing arranger 
liability as "generator plus"). 
50. Id. 
51. See, e.g., United States v. Hardage, 761 F. Supp. 1501, 1511 (W.D. Okla. 1990) 
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3» (noting that generator liability is imposed on one who 
arranged for disposal of hazardous waste); United States v. Bliss, 667 F. Supp. 1298, 
l306 (E.D. Mo. 1987) (imposing liability on parties for arranging for disposal of 
hazardous substances and finding that the arranger concept includes generators); 
Violet v. Picillo, 648 F. Supp. 1283, 1288 (D.R.I. 1986) (noting that generator liability 
is imposed on one who arranged for disposal, treatment, or transport to hazardous 
waste facility), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Davis, 794 F. Supp. 
67,71 (D.R.I. 1992). 
52. See Picillo, 648 F. Supp. at 1289-90 (citing many other cases for the proposition that 
the first element of proving "arranger" liability is "that the generator disposed of 
hazardous substances"). 
53. See, e.g., Bliss, 667 F. Supp. at l310. 
54. 577 F. Supp. 1326 (E.D. Pa. 1983). 
55. Id. at 1331-32 (describing the defendants' argument as raising the question of 
whether traditional notions of proximate causation applied to CERCLA while the 
Government argued that all that it was required to prove was that defendants' waste 
was disposed of at the site). 
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causation. 56 The court noted that the problem with that argument is 
that the provision enacted did not contain the causation language. 57 
Instead, the statute "specifies certain groups which [sic] will be held 
liable.,,58 Thus, causation is not a required element of arranger 
liability. 
In United States v. Ward,59 the court addressed whether a generator 
could be liable as an arranger when that generator did not take the 
time or effort to make any arrangements regarding disposal. The 
defendant argued that he sold waste oil to a party, who then made the 
decision to dispose of it. 60 The court concluded that such generators 
must be liable as arrangers because we should not "allow generators 
of hazardous wastes to escape liability under CERCLA by closing 
their eyes to the method in which their hazardous wastes were 
disposed of.,,61 It must be noted, however, that while Mr. Ward did 
not know how or where his waste was disposed of, he did pay 
someone to "get rid of' the waste and could therefore be seen as 
having arranged for disposal. 62 
Generators are liable even if they did not cause the waste to be 
shipped to the site that is being remediated (and therefore did not 
cause the contamination). 63 In United States v. Hardage,64 for 
example, the court held that the generator could be liable even if the 
generator did not know that the waste was sent to the site and even if 
the generator intended the waste to be disposed of elsewhere. 65 Thus, 
generators of waste are liable as arrangers even if they did not 
arrange to have the waste disposed of at the remediated site. 
Based on the early cases, if asked whether the generator concept or 
the causation concept best explained arranger liability, the answer 
would have to be the generator concept. 66 The generators of a 
56. ld. at 1332-33. 
57. ld. at 1334 ("The problem with the generator defendants' reliance on this report, 
however, is that the liability provision ultimately enacted bears no real resemblance to 
the House-passed bill to which the report refers."). 
58. Jd. 
59. 618 F. Supp. 884 (E.O.N.C. 1985). 
60. ld. at 895. 
61. ld.; see also United States v. Conservation Chern. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162 (W.O. Mo. 
1985) (noting that it would be anomalous to hold liable those who designate a 
destination for their waste, but not those who ignore what happens to their waste). 
62. Ward, 618 F. Supp. at 895 (concluding that what defendant described as sale of a 
product was in fact disposal ofa waste). 
63. See United States v. Hardage, 761 F. Supp. 1501, 1511 (W.O. Okla. 1990). 
64. 761 F. Supp. 1501. 
65. ld. at 1511. 
66. See discussion supra Part LB. 
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hazardous waste necessarily have that waste in their possession and 
control at some point in time. If the waste is then disposed of, that 
disposal must have been the result of some action by the generator, if 
only the act of releasing it to someone for transport or disposal. 
Causation, however, was not a requirement. 67 The generator was 
held liable even if the waste was disposed of somewhere other than 
where the generator intended and even if the generator's waste did 
not cause the response costS.68 
II. UNITED STATES V. ACETO AGRICULTURAL CHEMICALS 
CORP. 
A. Cause but Not Generator 
Aceto was very different from the generator cases because the 
defendants did not generate the waste or make any waste-related 
decisions. 69 The case arose out of contamination at a site owned and 
operated by Aidex Corporation, a pesticide formulator. 70 Industry 
practice in the pesticide industry was for pesticide manufacturers to 
contract with formulators to mix the pesticide ingredients to produce 
commercial-grade products for the manufacturer. 71 Pesticide 
manufacturers provided Aidex with ingredients and directions for 
formulation. 72 Aidex processed the ingredients and returned 
commercial-grade product to the manufacturers. 73 
The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) sought 
to hold six pesticide manufacturers liable for "arranging for disposal" 
of hazardous substances at the Aidex site. 74 The EPA's theory was as 
67. See, e.g., United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1331-34 (E.D. Pa. 1983). 
68. See, e.g., id. at 1332. 
69. See United States v. Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1375-76 (8th Cir. 
1989). 
70. See id. (noting that Aidex had operated the site from 1974 until 1981, when it went 
bankrupt). 
71. ld. The court noted that that the "complaint alleges it is common practice in the 
pesticide industry for manufacturers of active pesticide ingredients to contract with 
formulators such as Aidex to produce a commercial grade product." Id. 
72. ld. at 1375. There may have been some dispute as to Aidex's actual role, but the case 
reached the Court of Appeals after the District Court denied the defendants' motion to 
dismiss. ld. Thus, the court took the facts in the complaint as given. Id. 
73. Id. (noting that the defendants argued that they should not be liable because they hired 
Aidex to formulate, not to dispose). 
74. Id. at 1376-78. Eight pesticide manufacturers were named as defendants, but the 
complaint alleged causes of action under RCRA against all eight of them and causes 
of action under CERCLA against six of them. Id. 
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follows: (1) the manufacturers owned the ingredients that contained 
the hazardous substances that were released or disposed of at Aidex 75 
and (2) the manufacturers knew that the formulation process would 
result in the creation of hazardous waste. 76 Therefore, the 
manufacturers arranged for disposal of the waste disposed of by 
Aidex at the Aidex site. 77 
The court began its analysis by rejecting the defendants' argument 
that based on the dictionary definition of arrange, the defendants 
could only be liable if they intended to dispose of waste. 78 Next, the 
court reviewed the legislative history of the Superfund Law and 
concluded that "Congress intended that those responsible for the 
problem caused by disposal of chemical poisons bear the costS.,,79 
The court reasoned that this goal would be thwarted if persons could 
contract away their liability.80 The defendants argued that they had 
no control over Aidex operations and therefore could not have played 
a role in causing the disposal. 81 The court responded to this argument 
by noting that each manufacturer maintained ownership of the 
chemicals, which meant they had authority to control what happened 
with those chemicals and could thus have caused the disposal. 82 
The causation argument addressed by the Wade court is very 
different from the causation argument made by the Aceto court. The 
75. Id. at 1378. Indeed, the complaint alleged that the defendants owned the chemicals 
provided to Aidex, the work in progress, and the resulting commercial grade product. 
Id. 
76. Id. at 1379. The complaint alleged that generation of hazardous wastes was an 
inherent part of the formulation process. Id. 
77. Id. (noting that the district court relied on the principle that CERCLA should be 
interpreted broadly). 
78. Id. at 1380. The court noted that Congress intended a broad reading of "arranged for 
disposal." Id. 
79. Id. The court noted that S. 1480, the "Environmental Response Act," contained 
language that would have imposed liability on all who "caused or contributed to" the 
release of hazardous substances and that a Senate Committee had changed the 
language to "arranged for" disposal. Id. The court noted that the reasons for the 
change were "not easy to divine," but did not see the change in language as reflecting 
a change in policy. Id. 
80. Id. at 1381. The court cited New York v. Gen. Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. 291, 297 
(N.D.N.Y 1984) and United States v. A & F Materials Co., 582 F. Supp. 842, 845 
(S.D. Ill. 1984) for the proposition that CERCLA liability could not be 
"circumvented" by calling a disposal a sale and that persons could not "contract 
away" their liability. Id. 
81. Id. (noting that defendants contended that they should escape liability because they 
lacked control over Aidex). 
82. Id. The court noted that "it is the authority to control the handling and disposal of 
hazardous substances that is critical under the statutory scheme." Id. at 1381-82. 
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Wade defendants argued that they could not be liable because neither 
their activities nor their waste caused the response costs (the 
CERCLA equivalent of damages). 83 In a sense, their argument was 
that they were not responsible for the costs because those costs would 
have been incurred even if their waste were not at the site. In Aceto, 
on the other hand, the issue was who caused the contamination, not 
who caused the need to clean Up.84 The court understood the phrase 
"arranged for disposal" to mean "is responsible for this waste being 
here.,,85 While the manufacturers may not have made any waste-
related decisions, their business activities were, to a large extent, a 
cause of the creation of the contaminated site. 86 
Ownership of the hazardous substances also played a role in the 
Aceto decision regarding whether the arrangement was an 
arrangement for disposal. 87 The court noted that ownership implied 
the ability to control disposition of the chemicals, and the ability to 
control is the key to arranger liability. 88 The court based its decision, 
to a large extent, on the Court of Appeals decision in United States v. 
Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chemical Co. (NEPACCO).89 
NEPACCO is a generator case. The issue was whether corporate 
officers of a generator could be held liable as arrangers. 90 The 
NEPACCO court held that such individuals can be held liable as 
arrangers because they had authority to control the waste prior to 
disposal. 91 The Aceto court reasoned that if there could be liability in 
NEPACCO, where defendants did not own the hazardous substances, 
then there should be liability for the Aceto defendants who did own 
the hazardous substances. 92 
While the Aceto court attempted to align its decision with the 
generator cases such as NEPACCO, the concern addressed by the 
Aceto court is fundamentally different from the concern addressed by 
83. United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326,1331 (E.D. Pa. 1983). 
84. See Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1375. 
85. See infra Part II.B. 
86. See Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1384. 
87. Id. at 1379. 
88. Id. at 1381-82 (noting that there was no transfer of ownership of the hazardous 
substances). 
89. 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987). 
90. Id. at 743. 
91. Id. at 743-44. The defendants argued that only persons who owned or possessed the 
hazardous substances could be liable under § 9607(a)(3), and the court rejected that 
notion, concluding that persons with authority to control could be liable even without 
ownership or possession. Id. 
92. Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1382. 
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NEPACCO. In NEPACCO, the concern was that those who 
controlled the waste could avoid liability by ignoring what happened 
to the waste they controlled. 93 In Aceto, the defendants never 
controlled the waste. 94 The court's concern was that one could set up 
an elaborate set of contractual arrangements whereby one controls the 
process that creates the waste and thereby causes the site to be 
contaminated, but is nonetheless insulated from the liabilities related 
to the generation of the waste. 95 The court was concerned that 
someone could cause the problem but avoid liability by hiring 
someone else to be the generator of the waste. 96 
Was the use of Aidex as a formulator in Aceto a subterfuge to avoid 
CERCLA liability? No. The court's concern, however, was that if 
there was no liability for the Aceto_defendants, the court would have 
written the blueprint for such a subterfuge. 97 
B. Appellate Court Interpretations of Aceto 
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted Aceto in General 
Electric Co. v. AAMCO Transmissions, Inc. (AAMCO) 98 as an 
application of the traditional tort concept of duty. In AAMCO, the 
plaintiff alleged that a group of oil companies that sold petroleum 
products to service stations and had some ability to control activities 
at those service stations were liable as arrangers for the disposal of 
waste-petroleum products at the service stations. 99 The court rejected 
that argument and distinguished the AAMCO case from Aceto 
because in Aceto, the defendants controlled the process that generated 
the hazardous waste, whereas the AAMCO defendants merely had 
limited ability to control the process. 100 That difference, the court 
reasoned, imposed a duty on the Aceto defendants with regard to 
proper disposal of the waste but did not impose a duty on the 
AAMCO defendants. 101 
93. NEPACCO, 810 F.2d at 743-44. 
94. Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1375, 1379. 
95. Id. at 1381. 
96. Id. at 1381-82. 
97. Id. at 1382. 
98. 962 F.2d 281 (2d CiT. 1992). 
99. Id. at 283. 
100. Id. at 287 (citing Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 893 F.2d 1313, 
1319 (11 th CiT. 1990) (declining to hold a seller liable as an arranger when the seller 
could, by use of economic power, have forced its purchasers to properly dispose of 
waste)). 
101. Id. at 286 (distinguishing between the obligation to control and the mere opportunity 
to control). 
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The AAMCO court further explained that Congress relied on 
"traditional notions of duty and obligation" in detennining which 
parties would be liable under CERCLA. 102 Thus, the obligation to 
control makes one an arranger while merely having the ability to 
control does not.103 The court did not specify what "traditional notion 
of duty" obligated a contracting party to control the waste handling of 
another party. That "obligation" appears to be unique to CERCLA 
and unique to the Aceto court's view ofCERCLA. 104 
Traditional concepts of duty sound very much like negligence. 
Thus, the AAMCO court is showing support for the tort-based 
understanding of arranger liability that grows out of the Senate bill's 
attempt to base liability on causation. l05 While no one would suggest 
that the Aceto defendants had a negligence-type duty to prevent 
Aidex from polluting, the AAMCO court was taking the position that 
the Aceto decision means that when Congress used the "arranger" 
language, it intended to impose liability on anyone whose 
relationship with the transaction that led to the creation of the waste 
or to the contamination of the site was such that it could be seen as a 
cause of the contamination. 106 
The Aceto theory was further explained by the Ninth Circuit Court 
of Appeals in United States v. Shell Oil CO.107 (Shel!), where oil 
companies claimed that the United States government had sufficient 
control over their facilities during World War II to be held liable as 
arrangers for the waste generated at those facilities. 108 The oil 
companies interpreted Aceto to mean that where a party has control 
of a manufacturing process that generates hazardous waste, that party 
has an obligation to control the disposal of the hazardous waste 
generated by the process. 109 
102. Id. (noting that it is the obligation to exercise control that triggers liability). 
103. Id. 
104. See id. at 286-87 (noting that while most courts have premised a defendant's liability 
on some level of actual involvement in the disposal process, the Aceto court found the 
contracting defendants liable for the waste handling of a third-party company). 
105. See id. at 287 (suggesting that arranger liability must be based on some level of 
causation). 
106. See id. at 286 (noting that in order to assign arranger liability under CERCLA, the 
defendant must either be actually involved in the disposal process or have an 
obligation to arrange for or direct the disposal). 
107. 281 F.3d 812 (9th Cir. 2002). 
108. Id. at 816 (describing the degree of involvement the United States government had in 
the production ofavgas during World War II). 
109. Id. at 823 (the co~rt described this as the broader arranger liability theory and 
discussed the applicability of Aceto). 
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The Shell court accepted that definition but disagreed with the oil 
companies regarding the level of control exercised by the 
government. The court noted that in Aceto, the manufacturers owned 
the products that Aidex was working on and controlled the process 
employed by Aidex.llo That process necessarily included the 
generation of hazardous waste. In such circumstances, the person 
who owns the products and directs the processing has an obligation to 
take responsibility for the results of that process. IliOn the other 
hand, the government in Shell never owned the raw materials; it was 
merely a purchaser of finished products. 112 Unlike the Aceto 
defendants, it did not contract out the waste-generating step and then 
try to disclaim responsibility for the waste. 113 It was not, therefore, a 
cause of the contamination. 114 
The AAMCO and Shell courts both understood Aceto to be based on 
the causation model of arranger liability, reasoning that Congress 
intended persons to be liable as arrangers if their relationship to a 
transaction resulting in contamination was such that they should have 
taken steps to prevent the contamination. 115 The contrast between the 
cases, however, is important. The oil companies were suppliers who 
had some ability to control what their purchasers did. 116 The 
government in Shell, on the other hand, was a purchaser who had 
some element of control over what its supplier did.117 In Aceto, the 
defendants were both the suppliers of raw materials and the 
purchasers of the finished product. 118 Possibly, being on both sides of 
the transaction and controlling what happens in between by providing 
specifications for the processing includes the level of control that 
amounts to control of the waste. 119 
110. ld. (noting that the government never owned any of the raw materials). 
111. ld. 
112. ld. (following through with the attempted Aceto analogy, the court said that the 
government was more like a purchaser of pesticides than a pesticide manufacturer). 
113. ld. (noting that the government did not "contract out . . . a crucial and waste-
producing intermediate step in the manufacturing process, and then seek to disclaim 
responsibility"). 
114. See id. at 824-25. 
115. See id. at 825; Gen. Elec. Co. v. AAMCO Transmissions, Inc., 962 F.2d 281, 286 (2d 
Cir. 1992). 
116. AAMCO, 962 F.2d at 287. 
117. Shell, 281 F.3d at 816-17. 
118. See United States v. Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1375 (8th Cir. 1989). 
119. Compare Shell, 281 F.3d at 823, 826 (holding that a mere purchaser possessing the 
ability to control some supplier conduct was not an arranger), and AAMCO, 962 F.2d 
at 287-88 (holding that mere suppliers possessing the ability to control some 
purchaser conduct were not arrangers), with Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1375, 1384 (holding 
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The Sixth Circuit applied the Aceto theory in GenCorp, Inc. v. Olin 
Corp.,120 where the defendant appeared to be on both sides of the 
transaction. 121 The contamination was the result of a joint venture 
between Olin and GenCorp.122 The facility was jointly operated, and 
when Olin was held liable for waste sent off-site, it sued GenCorp 
and claimed that GenCorp was liable for the same waste as an 
arranger. 123 
The Sixth Circuit cited Aceto for the idea that courts should look 
beyond the parties' characterization of the transaction to see if the 
transaction was, in fact, an arrangement for disposal. 124 The court 
recognized that intent is important because the word arrange means 
to make a plan. 125 GenCorp claimed it never owned or possessed the 
waste nor made any decisions regarding arrangement for disposal. 126 
The court found those facts not necessarily relevant because GenCorp 
did knowingly participate in a transaction that included an 
arrangement for disposal. 127 The court did not examine whether 
GenCorp provided raw materials, purchased output, or controlled the 
process. None of that was necessary because GenCorp operated the 
facility that generated the waste. 128 The court's focus was on how to 
characterize the transaction-whether it was a sale of a product or a 
that a finn supplying raw materials, receiving finished product, and controlling some 
aspects of processing was an arranger). 
120. 390 F.3d 433 (6th Cir. 2004). 
121. Id. at 438-39. 
122. Id. at 438--40. 
123. Id. at 438--41. The relationship between the parties was more complex than in Aceto 
because in addition to joint ownership and operation of the facility, the purpose of the 
facility was to produce toluene di-isocyanate, which was a critical ingredient in 
GenCorp's manufacture of urethane. Compare id. at 438-39 (noting the joint 
operation and needs of urethane manufacture), with Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1375 (noting 
that the end product was sold to consumers, not used in the defendants' facilities). 
Thus, GenCorp was funding the manufacture of a product it would purchase from the 
facility for use of its facilities. See GenCorp, 390 F.3d at 438. 
124. GenCorp, 390 F.3d at 446 (noting that looking beyond the parties' characterization of 
the transaction required a fact-driven inquiry). 
125. Id. at 445--46 (quoting Webster's New College Dictionary for its definition of 
arrange). 
126. Id. at 446. 
127. Id. (noting that arrange for disposal did not require an intent to dispose of waste; it 
required an intent to engage in a transaction that included the disposal of hazardous 
substances). 
128. Id. at 439. 
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transaction that included disposal. 129 If the transaction included the 
generation and disposal of hazardous waste, each party to that 
transaction arranged for disposal. 130 
The Eleventh Circuit gave limited approval to the Aceto theory in 
South Florida Water Management. District v. Montalvo. 131 The issue 
in Montalvo was whether farmers and ranchers who contracted for 
the aerial spraying of pesticides and herbicides on their properties 
could be liable as arrangers for the contamination at the air strip 
owned by the party who did the spraying.132 The sprayers tried to 
analogize their case to Aceto. 133 The farmers owned the pesticides 
and knew that spillage was a necessary part of the application 
process. 134 If not for the process required by the farmers, there would 
have been no contamination. 135 Thus, the farmers were, effectively, 
the cause ofthe contamination. 136 
The court rejected that analogy, concluding that the relationship 
between the sprayers and the farmers bore little resemblance to 
Aceto. 137 In Aceto, the manufacturers provided the chemicals, 
specified what chemicals to mix, and retained ownership of the 
chemicals throughout. 138 From that, the court noted that "it was 
possible to infer that the manufacturers exercised some control over 
the formulator's mixing process." 139 Additionally, while in Aceto the 
129. Id. at 446 (listing numerous facts that led the district court to correctly conclude that 
the transaction GenCorp participated in was not merely the purchase of a product but 
also included preparations for waste disposal). 
130. See id. 
131. 84 F.3d 402, 408 n.9 (II th Cir. 1996) (noting that reference to Aceto in prior Eleventh 
Circuit decisions "cannot be interpreted as a wholesale adoption of Aceto as the law of 
this circuit"). 
132. Id. at 404-06. The Government sued the sprayers and the sprayers brought a third-
party action against the farmers. Id. The theory underlying the third-party complaint 
was that the sprayers' use and handling of hazardous substances was solely for the 
benefit of the farmers and the farmers knew that hazardous waste was a byproduct of 
the sprayers' activities. Id. Therefore, the farmers arranged for disposal of waste. Id. 
133. Id. at 408 (noting that the sprayers argued that the farmers controlled the spraying). 
134. Id. at 407. 
135. Id. at 409. 
136. ld. at 407 (assessing the sprayers' argument that the farmers should be liable on a 
common-law agency theory). The court cited Aceto for the proposition that common-
law agency theory can be relevant to determining who is an arranger but concluded 
that, in this case, the sprayers were not the agents of the farmers for purposes of waste 
disposal. Id. at 407 n.8. 
137. ld. at 407--08 (noting several factual distinctions between the case at bar and Aceto). 
138. United States v. Aceto Agric. Chern. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1375 (8th Cir. 1989). 
139. Montalvo, 84 F.3d at 408 (citing Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1381-82) (noting that the key 
difference is that in Aceto it was possible to infer that the manufacturers exercised 
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mIxmg process '''inherently' involved the creation of hazardous 
waste," the service contracted for by the farmers did not necessarily 
include the creation of hazardous wastes. 140 While the sprayers 
alleged that waste was a necessary part of the process, the court noted 
that there was no reason to believe the farmers knew this. 141 The 
court recognized the need to look beyond the way the parties had 
characterized their transaction to determine whether the facts indicate 
an arrangement for disposal. 142 In this case, however, the facts 
indicate that the farmers had merely contracted for a service. 143 
The GenCorp and Montalvo courts understood Aceto differently 
than the AAMCO and Shell courts did. The AAMCO and Shell courts 
saw Aceto as representing the concept that one's relationship to the 
transaction that created the waste or the contamination can impose an 
obligation or responsibility regarding waste disposal. 144 In GenCorp 
and Montalvo, on the other hand, Aceto stands for the proposition that 
a court must look beyond the parties' characterization of the 
transaction to determine the true intent of the transaction-regardless 
of what the parties say, was this transaction an arrangement for 
disposal of hazardous waste? 145 
Thus, depending on what circuit you are in, Aceto-type liability 
means (1) arranger liability based on being party to the type of 
transaction that would impose a duty to assure that waste resulting 
from the transaction is taken care of properly or (2) arranger liability 
based on having been a party to a transaction that, regardless of how 
the parties characterize the transaction, was, in fact, an arrangement 
for the disposal of hazardous waste. 
If we compare these descriptions of Aceto we see that they directly 
address whether Congress intended arranger liability to be based 
some control of the fonnulator's process, while that control was not present in this 
case). 
140. Jd. The court dealt with this issue in two ways. First, the court stated that spraying 
"does not obviously involve the creation and disposal of hazardous waste." Id. Then, 
noting that plaintiffs had alleged that creation of hazardous waste was inherent in the 
process and on a motion to dismiss; the court was to accept the facts as pled, the court 
stated that the sprayers never alleged that the fanners knew this. Id. at 407-08. 
141. Id. at 408-09 (citing Aceto for the importance of this knowledge). 
142. Id. at 408 n.9 (citing Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 893 F.2d 1313, 
1318 (lith Cir. 1990)). 
143. Id. at 408-09. 
144. See United States v. Shell Oil Co., 281 F.3d 812, 822 (9th Cir. 2002); Gen. Elec. Co. 
v. AAMCO Transmissions, Inc., 962 F.2d 281, 286-87 (2d CiT. 1992). 
145. See GenCorp, Inc. v. Olin Corp., 390 F.3d 433, 446 (6th CiT. 2004); Montalvo, 84 
F.3d at 408 n.9. 
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primarily on causation or whether Congress intended it to be based 
primarily on the generator concept. 146 The Second Circuit's view 
based on duty takes the position that even though Congress did not 
include causation language, it intended essentially a tort-based 
concept. 147 The Sixth Circuit's rule is essentially based on generator 
liability.148 Regardless of how the parties characterize their position, 
was the defendant, in fact, someone whose status was that of a 
generator? 
The question of how to characterize the transaction is further 
developed in the line of cases that address whether the seller of a 
useful product can have arranger liability. 
III. SALE OF A USEFUL PRODUCT AS A DEFENSE TO 
ARRANGER LIABILITY 
A number of courts have recognized a defense to arranger liability 
where the defendant can successfully argue that it was not the 
generator of waste who arranged for its disposal or treatment but 
instead the seller of a product that contained hazardous substances, 
which were later disposed of or released by someone else. In 
Freeman v. Glaxo Wellcome, Inc., 149 the Second Circuit explained 
why sellers of useful hazardous substances do not have arranger 
liability. Glaxo, upon closing a facility, sold chemical reactants used 
in its facility to Freeman Industries, Inc. (FII) for use in FII's 
business. ISO FH used some of the· chemicals in its business, stored 
some of them, and sold some of them. The stored chemicals became 
the source of a remedial action by the EPA at the FII facility, and the 
EPA sued Glaxo and claimed Glaxo had arranged for disposal of its 
chemicals at the FH facility. 151 Glaxo's defense was that it merely 
sold the chemicals. 152 
After going through the long list of cases holding that one cannot 
circumvent the Superfund Law by characterizing disposal as a sale,153 
146. Compare Shell, 281 F.3d at 822, and AAMCO, 962 F.2d at 286-87, with GenCorp, 
390 F.3d at 446, and Montalvo, 84 F.3d at 408. 
147. See AAMCO, 962 F.2d at 286. 
148. See GenCorp, 390 F.3d at 445-46. 
149. 189 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 1999). 
150. ld. at 162. Mr. Freeman inspected the chemicals and purchased them "both for use in 
the Freeman laboratories and for resale." ld. 
151. ld at 163. Glaxo moved for summary judgment and the district court granted the 
motion. ld. 
152. ld. at 164 (noting that "it is uncontroverted" that Glaxo merely sold chemicals). 
153. ld. (citing Pneumo Abex Corp. v. High Point, Thomasville & Denton R.R., 142 F.3d 
769 (4th Cir. 1998); Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 893 F.2d 1313 
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the court noted that Glaxo had sold valuable products to FII for use or 
resale. These were virgin chemicals, not waste. 154 Arrangement for 
disposal requires the presence of waste. 155 Therefore, Glaxo did not 
arrange for disposal at the FII facility. 156 
In Pneumo Abex Corp. v. High Point, Thomasville & Denton 
R.R.,157 the Fourth Circuit provided further analysis of how to 
determine whether a transaction is a "sale" or an arrangement for 
disposal. The court explained that to determine "whether a 
transaction was for the discard of hazardous substances or for the sale 
of valuable materials," the key factors to examine are the intent of the 
parties and the usefulness of the product. 158 
The transaction in Pneumo was the sale of used bearings to be 
processed into new bearings.159 The processing generated waste, but 
the court found that the essence of the transaction was payment in 
exchange for bearings, not an attempt to dispose of unwanted 
metal. 160 Thus, the seller did not arrange for disposal. 
The Sixth Circuit in United States v. Cello-Foil Products, Inc., 161 
addressed a more complex transaction in which there were elements 
of both the sale of a useful product and disposal of waste. 162 The 
court recognized that if the material at issue (the subject of the 
transaction) is waste, the transaction is an arrangement for disposal; 
(11th Cir. 1990); United States v. Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373 (8th Cir. 
1989)). 
154. Id. 
155. Id. ("Because the definition of 'disposal' refers to 'waste,' only transactions that 
involve 'waste' constitute arrangements for disposal .... "). 
156. Id. 
157. 142 F.3d 769 (4th Cir. 1998). 
158. Id. at 775 (noting that whether the materials were to be reused in their entirety played 
a role in determining intent and the value of the goods sold plays a role in determining 
whether the materials are, in fact, waste). 
159. Id. at 772-73 (noting that the "conversion agreements" provided that used journal 
bearings were shipped to Pneumo's foundry for processing and the seller of the used 
bearings received a credit against the purchase price of new bearings based on the 
weight of the bearings). 
160. Id. at 775 (citing several cases that examined what was being sold as the means to 
determine the intent of the parties and noting that the waste generated by the 
reclamation of the bearings was incidental to the reclamation of the bearings and not 
the essence of the transaction). 
16L 100 F.3d 1227 (6th Cir. 1996). 
162. Id. at 1230. The defendants were purchasers of solvents in a transaction that was the 
sale of a useful product, but the transaction required the defendants to return the used 
drums to the seller. Id. This return of the used drums with some waste residue was 
alleged to be the arrangement for disposal. Id. 
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and conversely, if the material at issue is a useful product, the 
transaction is not arrangement for disposal. 163 
In Cello-Foil, the defendants were purchasers of solvents. 164 The 
contract of sale provided that Thomas Solvents, the seller, would 
deliver solvents in reusable drums, and the price included a drum 
deposit. 165 The purchasers used the solvents and returned the drums 
to Thomas, who cleaned and reused the drums. 166 The Government 
argued that the arrangement was impliedly an arrangement for 
disposal of waste because the drums that were returned contained 
some solvent residue, which was the source of the contamination at 
the Thomas facility.167 The defendants argued that they could not be 
liable because they lacked the intent to dispose of the waste. 168 
The court began its analysis by noting that the legislation does not 
define the phrase "arrange for."169 The court noted that the Seventh 
Circuit had defined "arrange for" to include an element of intent in 
Amcast Industrial Corp. v. Detrex Corp., 170 where Judge Posner 
reasoned that the phrase "arrange for disposal" contemplates a case in 
which a person wants to get rid of something.171 Thus, if the 
defendant did not intend to get rid of a hazardous substance, there has 
been no arrangement for disposal. 172 The Cello-Foil court expanded 
on this concept, concluding that intent is a requirement because 
arrangement embraces concepts similar to contract and agreement. 173 
To arrange means to "'make preparations' or 'plan,'" both of which 
are actions that include an intent requirement. 174 Thus, what the 
163. Id. at 1232 (citing AM Int'!, Inc. v. Int'I Forging Equip. Corp., 982 F.2d 989, 999 (6th 
Cir. 1993)). 
164. Id. at 1230 (describing the tenns ofthe defendants' purchase of solvents). 
165. Id. When purchasers returned the used drums and purchased more solvent, the 
deposit was credited against the purchase price. Id. 
166. Id. (noting that the contents of the returned drums varied, with some as empty as 
possible and some containing as much as fifteen gallons of solvent). 
167. Id. (noting that this arrangement resulted in the contamination at issue whereby 
reusable drums were used and returned to the seller with some remaining solvent that 
the seller disposed of or released to the environment). 
168. Id. 
169. Id.at1231. 
170. 2 F.3d 746 (7th Cir. 1993). 
17l. Id. at 751 (concluding that Detrex arranged for transport of hazardous substances but 
did not arrange for them to spill). 
172. See id. 
173. 100 F.3d at 1231 (noting that the statute connects arranged for disposal with the 
phrase "by contract, agreement, or otherwise"). 
174. Id. at 1232 (quoting Amcast, 2 F.3d at 751) (noting that an intent requirement is not 
inconsistent with strict liability because intent only determines whether the person is a 
potentially responsible party, and ifhe or she is, then strict liability applies). 
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parties intended can determine how the transaction will be 
characterized. 175 
To determine what the parties intended, courts look to the totality 
of the circumstances, not to how the parties characterize their 
transaction. 176 Thus, in Cello-Foil, the court noted that by leaving 
solvents in the drums, which the defendants knew Thomas would 
take away and dispose of, one could infer the intent to dispose of 
those solvents. 177 In Amcast, on the other hand, the court found that 
when a seller of solvents gives the solvents to a transporter to deliver 
to a user, the seller has not arranged for disposal of solvent 
accidentally spilled by the transporter. 178 The transaction was a sale 
of a useful product and did not include intent to dispose of 
anything. 179 
The key difference between Amcast and Cello-Foil is what was 
being transferred. In Cello-Foil, the defendant transferred waste, and 
based on that, the court found that the transaction could be considered 
an arrangement for disposal. 180 In Amcast, on the other hand, the 
material was not waste, and therefore, the transaction was not an 
arrangement for disposal.I 81 The principle underlying both cases is 
that if the subject matter of the transaction is waste, the transaction is 
more likely to be seen as an arrangement for disposal. 182 
IV. BURLINGTON NORTHERN & SANTA FE RAILWAY Co. V 
UNITED STATES 
A. The Court's Decision 
Burlington Northern is the first. Supreme Court decision addressing 
the definition of "arrange for disposal." The case arose out of 
contamination at a site owned and operated by Brown & Bryant, Inc. 
175. ld. at 1233-34 (concluding that defendants are not liable under § 107(a)(3) of 
CERCLA without a showing that they intended to dispose of hazardous substances). 
176. See, e.g., id. at 1232-34. 
177. Jd. at 1233-34 (denying the defendants' motion for summary judgment because issues 
of fact existed regarding whether there was an intent to dispose of waste). 
178. Amcast, 2 F.3d at 751. 
179. Jd. 
180. Cella-Foil, 100 F.3d at 1233-34. 
181. Amcast, 2 F.3d at 75l. 
182. Compare Cello-Foil, 100 F.3d at 1233-34 (stating that the issue of whether waste was 
involved was relevant to liability), with Amcast, 2 F.3d at 751 (stating that if a shipper 
arranges for the delivery of a useful product, the shipper cannot be held liable under 
CERCLA for a carrier's mishap). 
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(B&B), a small chemical distributor. 183 Shell sold a number of 
products to B&B, including pesticides known as D-D and 
Nemagon. 184 Various spills and releases at the B&B site resulted in 
contamination of the soil and groundwater. 185 The State of California 
and EPA undertook remedial efforts at the site,186 and after B&B 
went out of business, the State named Shell and Burlington Northern 
as responsible parties. 187 Shell was alleged to have arranger liability 
because chemicals it sold to B&B were allegedly spilled on 
delivery. 188 The Government alleged that Burlington Northern was 
liable as an owner because a portion of the B&B facility was on 
property B&B leased from Burlington Northern. 189 
The case could be seen as the intersection between the sale of a 
useful product cases and the Aceto line of cases. Shell argued that it 
was merely selling a useful product and no court has ever held that 
sale of a useful product is an arrangement for disposal of hazardous 
substances. 19o The Government, on the other hand, argued that when 
Shell sold its products, it knew that the system of delivery it had set 
up always included some spillage upon delivery. 191 That knowledge, 
the Government argued, plus Shell's control of the delivery process 
meant that what Shell called merely a sale was, in fact, an 
arrangement for the disposal of hazardous substances. 192 
The district court held Shell liable as an arranger and the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. 193 The Court of Appeals noted 
183. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1870, 1874-75 (2009). 
B&B had begun operations in 1960 on an approximately 3.8 acre parcel. Jd. at 1874. 
B&B stored chemicals on-site and applied them to customers' farms. Id. at 1875. 
184. Id. at 1875 (noting that because D-D was corrosive, it resulted in numerous tank 
failures and spills). 
185. Id. 
186. Id. at 1875-76. The California Department of Toxic Substances Control began 
investigating the site in 1983. Id. at 1875. The site was added to the National 
Priorities List in 1989. Id. at 1876. 
187. Id. at 1876. 
188. Id. 
189. Jd. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Burlington Northern was jointly and 
severally liable for all of the cleanup costs even though it did not contribute to the 
contamination and it only owned a portion of the site for a portion of the time the site 
operated. Id. at 1877. The court reversed, holding that CERCLA liability is not joint 
and several where, as here, there is some reasonable basis for allocating the costs. Id. 
at 1882-83. 
190. Reply Brief of Petitioner at 14, Burlington N., 129 S. Ct. 1870 (No. 07-1607). 
191. Brief for the United States at 12, Burlington N., 129 S. Ct. 1870 (No. 07-1607). 
192. Id. at 13. 
193. United States v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 520 F.3d 918,952 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(amended opinion), rev'd, 129 S. Ct. 1870. 
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that although Shell was not a "traditional" arranger, in the sense that 
it did not transact with B&B to dispose of hazardous waste, it could 
be held liable under the "broader" arranger theory, where disposal is 
not the goal of the transaction but is a foreseeable byproduct. 194 The 
court discussed whether arranger liability needed to be purposeful 
and concluded that it did not because "disposal" is defined in 
CERCLA to include activities such as leaking that could occur 
accidentally.195 The court also noted that Shell had sent directions for 
the delivery process in an attempt to limit the amount of spillage. 196 
These directions were seen by the court as an element of Shell's 
control of the delivery process. 197 
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Shell was not liable as 
an arranger. 198 The Court began its analysis of the arranger issue by 
looking to the statute, noting that the language of CERCLA makes 
clear that one who enters a transaction "for the sole purpose of 
discarding" a hazardous substance, "arrange[s] for disposal.,,199 At 
the same time, if one merely sells a useful product and the purchaser, 
"unbeknownst to the seller, disposed of the product," the seller has 
not arranged for disposal. 200 The intermediate cases, the Court stated, 
are more difficult. 201 Two intermediate cases mentioned by the Court 
are (1) where the seller has some knowledge of the buyer's planned 
disposal and (2) where the seller's motive for sale of the substance is 
less than clear. 202 In such cases, courts require "a fact-intensive 
inquiry that looks beyond the parties' characterization of the 
transaction ... to discern whether the arrangement was one Congress 
intended to fall within the scope of CERCLA's strict-liability 
194. ld. at 948-49 (defining "broader" arranger liability as cases in which a person does 
not contract directly for disposal but engages in a transaction that indirectly results in 
the disposal of hazardous substances). 
195. ld. at 949 (discussing the definition of disposal, which includes "leaking," which can 
occur accidentally). 
196. Id. at 950-51 (stating that Shell's change of its delivery practices to reduce spillage 
showed that it knew of the spillage and that it had some control). 
197. Id. 
198. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1870, 1880 (2009). 
199. Jd. at 1878. 
200. Id. (citing Freeman v. Glaxo Wellcome, Inc., 189 F.3d 160, 164 (2d Cir. 1999)). 
201. Id. at 1879. 
202. ld. 
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provisions."z03 The cases cited by the Court indicate that the issue is 
whether the transaction is, in essence, a sale or a disposal. Z04 
The Court cautioned against taking that "fact-intensive inquiry" 
beyond the limits of the statute. Z05 Because Congress did not define 
arrange for disposal, the Court looked to the common understanding 
of the phrase. Z06 For the common understanding of the word arrange, 
the Court looked to the Merriam-Webster College Dictionary, which 
defined arrange as "to make preparations for: plan; ... to bring about 
an agreement or understanding conceming."z07 Based on this, the 
Court concluded that an entity "may qualify as an arranger under 
§ 9607(a)(3) when it takes intentional steps to dispose of a hazardous 
substance. ,,208 
The Government argued that because disposal is defined broadly to 
include unintentional acts such as spilling and leaking, one can 
arrange for disposal unintentionally.209 The Government further 
argued that Shell could be liable as an arranger because it sold its 
product with the knowledge that some product will spill and result in 
disposal. zlO The Court rejected both of these arguments.2lI 
The Court recognized that there may be circumstances where 
knowledge that the product will be spilled or disposed of will show 
intent to dispose of hazardous substances. 212 However, knowledge 
alone does not create such an inference. 213 To be liable, the Court 
203. ld. 
204. ld. (citing Freeman, 189 F.3d at 164; Pneumo Abex Corp. v. High Point, Thomasville 
& Denton R.R., 142 F.3d 769, 775 (4th Cir. 1998). All of the cases cited could be 
seen as raising the defense of sale of a useful product. See, e.g., id. 
205. ld. This is probably a reference to the cases that focus on whether the defendant has 
some element of responsibility for the waste even though one cannot say that they 
made an arrangement for disposal. 
206. ld. 
207. ld. The Court stated that when a statute does not define a concept, courts are to give 
the concept its ordinary meaning. ld. (citing Crawford v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & 
Davidson Cnty., 129 S. Ct. 846,850 (2009); Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 
(1979)). 
208. ld. (noting that state of mind plays an indispensible role in determining whether a 
party has arranged for disposal of hazardous substances). 
209. ld. (discussing the definition of "disposal"). 
210. ld. (quoting the portion of the Government's brief that argued that Shell's knowledge 
of the spills made Shell liable as an arranger). 
211. ld. at 1880. 
212. ld. (noting that knowledge alone, however, is never sufficient to prove that defendant 
planned for disposal). 
213. ld. (noting that although there may be circumstances in which knowledge of spills 
may lead to an inference that the transaction is an arrangement for disposal, 
knowledge alone is insufficient). 
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stated, "Shell must have entered into the sale of D-D with the 
intention that at least a portion of the product be disposed of during 
the transfer process.,,214 Here, however, Shell took steps to prevent 
such spills. 215 The spills could not, therefore, have been intended by 
Shell. 216 
B. Three Questions About Burlington Northern 
To understand the Supreme Court's decision, we need to closely 
examine three places where the Court appears to have used imprecise 
or uncertain language. First, the Court stated that "an entity may 
qualify as an arranger under § 9607(3) when it takes intentional steps 
to dispose of a hazardous substance.,,217 The use of the word may is 
puzzling because based on other portions of the decision, it would 
seem that anyone who takes intentional steps to dispose of a 
hazardous substance has necessarily arranged for disposal. 218 Thus, 
we need to examine the decision to determine whether the Court's 
position is that there are cases in which a person takes intentional 
steps to dispose of a hazardous substance and does not qualify as an 
arranger or whether the Court is telling us that intentional steps to 
dispose are not the only way to arrange for disposal. 
Second, the Court noted "that in some instances an entity's 
knowledge that its product will be leaked, spilled, dumped, or 
otherwise discarded may provide evidence of the entity's intent to 
dispose.,,219 What cases are those-could this be a reference to the 
Aceto scenario? 
Third, the Court sometimes used the phrase "intent to dispose" and 
sometimes it used the phrase "intentional steps to dispose.,,22o Are 
those two different things? This distinction could be crucial because 
while intent is clearly required, the defendants in Aceto intentionally 
participated in a transaction that included disposal, but they did not 
have intent to dispose. 221 
214. Id. (noting that the facts of this case did not support such a conclusion). 
215. Id. (noting that Shell had provided safety manuals and required adequate storage in an 
attempt to reduce or prevent spillage). 
216. Id. 
217. Id. at 1879 (emphasis added) (noting that inquiry into state of mind is indispensible). 
218. Id. at 1878 (stating that "[i]t is plain from the language of the statute" that if one 
enters into a transaction for the "sole purpose of discarding a used ... hazardous 
substance," liability would attach). 
219. Id. at 1880. 
220. See, e.g., id. at 1879-80. 
221. United States v. Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1379 (8th Cir. 1989). 
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1. What Did the Court Mean by "May Qualify"? 
Did the Court use the phrase "may qualify" to indicate that there 
are cases where the defendant took "intentional steps to dispose of a 
hazardous substance" but did not incur arranger liability?222 One 
could view Pneuma and Cello-Foil as such cases. 223 In both cases, 
the transaction included sale of a useful product and some waste 
material that was expected to be discarded. 224 Thus, one could view 
each transaction as one that included intentional steps to dispose of a 
hazardous substance. In each case, however, the courts looked to the 
essence of the transaction and asked what did the seller really 
intend-was this transaction primarily about getting rid of waste, or 
was it primarily about selling something the buyer intended to use?225 
If the latter, there is no arranger liability. 226 
The Burlington Northern Court cited both cases favorably in its 
discussion of how to determine whether a defendant is liable as an 
arranger. 227 Thus, it could be that when the Court said that an entity 
"may qualify as an arranger. . . when it takes intentional steps to 
dispose of a hazardous substance," it meant to inform us that 
intentional steps to dispose are not sufficient to create liability. 228 A 
court must look to all the circumstances and determine whether the 
essence of the transaction was disposal. 229 If so, the intentional steps 
will incur liability, and if not, the intentional steps will not incur 
liability. 230 
A second possible understanding of the Court's use of the phrase 
"may qualify" instead of "does qualify," addresses whether liability 
arises where the hazardous substance disposed of is not a waste. 231 It 
is important to note that while most of CERCLA addresses the 
release of hazardous substances to the environment, § 9607(3) may 
be limited to hazardous waste.232 Section 9607(3) incorporates the 
definition of disposal, which means the "discharge, deposit, [ or] 
222. Burlington N., 129 S. Ct. at 1879. 
223. Pneumo Abex Corp. v. High Point, Thomasville & Denton R.R., 142 F.3d 769 (4th 
Cir. 1998); United States v. Cello-Foil Prods., Inc., 100 F.3d 1227 (6th Cir. 1996). 
224. Pneuma, 142 F.3d at 772-73; Cello-Foil, 100 F.3d at 1229-30. 
225. Pneuma, 142 F.3d at 775-76; Cello-Foil, 100 F.3d at 1231-34. 
226. See Amcast Indus. Corp. v. Detrex Corp., 2 F.3d 746,751 (7th Cir. 1993). 
227. Burlington N., 129 S. Ct. at 1878-79. 
228. Id. at 1879. 
229. See id. at 1878-79. 
230. See id. 
231. See id. at 1879. 
232. See 42 V.S.c. §§ 6903(3),9601(29), 9607(a)(3) (2006). 
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injection" of any "hazardous waste."m Indeed, in Burlington 
Northern, Shell argued that it could not have liability because the 
product that was spilled or released was not a hazardous waste. 234 
The Court does not seem to have accepted this distinction between 
hazardous substance and hazardous waste. Indeed, the Court used the 
broader term hazardous substances throughout its decision.235 Thus, 
by implication, the Court rejected Shell's argument that there could 
be no liability unless the subject matter of the transaction was a 
hazardous waste. 236 The decisive factor, the Court explained, is not 
what the transaction is about (i.e., did the transaction involve waste), 
but what the parties intended when they engaged in the transaction. 237 
The Court made clear that the subject matter of the transaction will 
playa role in understanding the intent of the parties. 238 That is, waste 
can indicate intent to dispose. 239 However, the subject matter is a 
factor in determining what the parties intended; intent is not the 
means of determining the subject matter of the transaction. 240 
A third possible understanding of the Court's use of "may" is that 
the Court was informing us that intentional steps to dispose are not 
necessary to produce arranger liability. Think back to the early 
generator cases. 241 In United States v. Ward,242 for example, there 
was no evidence that the defendant made any arrangement for 
disposal. 243 The court nevertheless found liability because the 
defendant was the generator of the waste and a party should not be 
able to escape liability by closing its eyes to what happens to its 
233. See id. 
234. Brief for Petitioner at 22, Burlington N., 129 S. Ct. 1870 (No. 07-1607) (arguing that 
the correct understanding of "arranged for disposal" must incorporate the statutory 
definition of disposal, and that 42 U.S.C. § 9601(29) ties disposal to hazardous waste). 
235. Burlington N., 129 S. Ct. at 1878-79 (where the phrase "hazardous substances" 
appears at least seven times and hazardous waste is discussed only in responding to 
the Government's argument that disposal required hazardous waste). 
236. The Court did not respond directly to Shell's argument, but the Court's consistent use 
of "substances" where it could have used "waste" implies that waste is not a 
requirement for liability. See id. at 1878-80. 
237. Id. at 1880 (stating that for there to be liability, Shell must have entered into the 
transaction with the intention that some of the product be disposed of during the 
transfer process). 
238. See id. 
239. See id. (discussing what facts may indicate an intent to dispose). 
240. See id. (explaining that knowledge that a product will be leaked may provide evidence 
of intent to dispose). 
241. See discussion supra Part I.B. 
242. 618 F. Supp. 884 (E.D.N.C. 1985); see also discussion supra Part LB. 
243. Ward, 618 F. Supp. at 895. 
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waste. 244 The Burlington Northern Court's use of the word may 
could mean, then, that intentional steps are not the only way to incur 
arranger liability. 
Does the Court's reasoning that arranger liability includes an intent 
element mean that one who negligently handles hazardous waste and 
thus causes a release to the environment cannot be liable as an 
arranger? The policies underlying the Ward decision suggest the 
answer is no.245 There are numerous generator cases in which the 
generator mishandled the waste and that mishandling was seen as an 
arrangement for disposal. 246 If the Court intended such a change in 
the law, the Court should have been explicit about it. 
That explains why the Court talked about "intentional steps to 
dispose" as opposed to intent to dispose247-the Court was in fact 
being precise. Any person who disposes of hazardous waste has 
arranged for disposal. That issue was not before the Court; the issue 
before the Court was a transaction where the defendant was removed 
from the generation and disposal of waste. 248 In such a case, the 
defendant's intent to take steps toward disposal is necessary-the key 
being the purpose of the steps the defendant took. 249 
2. Why Did the Court Say "In Some Instances"? 
The Court stated that "in some instances," knowledge that the 
product being sold will be discarded may provide evidence of the 
entity's intent to dispose of its hazardous wastes. 250 The Court cited 
nothing for that proposition, thus leaving the reader with little 
evidence of what those instances are. 251 This would have been an 
appropriate place for citing Aceto or other cases in that line, but the 
Court chose not to do so. In each of those cases, the defendant knew 
244. ld. 
245. See id. 
246. See, e.g., United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 169 (4th Cir. 1988) (reasoning 
that the United States has made out a prima facie case if it shows that the generator's 
waste was shipped to the site); United States v. Conso!. Rail Corp., 729 F. Supp. 1461, 
1469 (D. De!. 1990) (reasoning that authority to make waste-related decisions is 
sufficient to impose generator liability); Violet v. Picillo, 648 F. Supp. 1283, 1291-92 
(D.R.I. 1986) (reasoning that generators are liable regardless of whether they carefully 
determined what would happen to the waste). 
247. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1870,1879 (2009). 
248. ld. 
249. See id. at 1879-80. 
250. ld. at 1880. 
251. See id. 
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that the transaction would generate hazardous waste. 252 The Court, 
however, continued with a discussion of Shell's activities. 253 Shell 
took steps to reduce the likelihood that there would be spills. This 
showed Shell's knowledge of the disposal. 254 Unlike the court of 
appeals, who saw this as rather damning evidence (Shell clearly knew 
that there would be spills and everyone intends the known or 
expected consequences of their actions), the Court saw this as 
evidence that Shell did not intend spills to occur. 255 Thus, the phrase 
"in some instances" is meant as a limitation, a rejection of those 
decisions that saw knowledge that disposal would occur as always 
implying an arrangement for disposal. 
There is a potentially significant difference between Shell's 
knowledge that some spills would occur and Aceto's knowledge that 
hazardous waste would be generated by the transaction. 256 Shell's 
knowledge of accidental spills of virgin product does not necessarily 
indicate intent to dispose of that product. Knowledge that a 
transaction will generate hazardous waste, however, is a greater 
indicator of an intent to dispose of waste, because hazardous waste 
must be disposed of. By only discussing spills of virgin product, as 
opposed to generation of waste, the Court has left open the possibility 
that Aceto-type cases are the "some instances" referred to by the 
Court. 257 
The Court's message, then, is that knowledge that there will be 
spills or that material will be discarded is not sufficient to create 
liability. 258 Knowledge is some evidence, but the goal of the inquiry 
is to determine the defendant's intent when it entered the transaction. 
If the intent was disposal, then the transaction is an arrangement for 
disposal. 259 
252. See, e.g., United States v. Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1381 (8th Cir. 
1989). 
253. Burlington N., 129 S. Ct. at 1880. 
254. ld. 
255. ld. at 1877, 1880. 
256. Compare id. at 1880 (holding that Shell's awareness of some potential spillage was 
insufficient evidence to infer that Shell intended such spills to occur), with Aceto, 872 
F.2d at 1382 (affirming the imposition of liability on defendants who owned the 
hazardous substances at issue and retained ultimate authority over the work in 
progress). 
257. See Burlington N., 129 S. Ct. at 1880. 
258. See id. ("[K]nowledge alone is insufficient to prove than an entity 'planned for' the 
disposal .... "). 
259. See id. (noting that an entity can be considered an arranger "when it takes intentional 
steps to dispose of a hazardous substance"). 
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3. Why Did the Court Say "Steps to Dispose" as Opposed to 
"Intent to Dispose"? 
[Vol. 40 
While it is clear that arrange includes an element of intent, the 
Court could have been more precise in defining what intent is 
required. The Court moves back and forth between intent to dispose 
and intent to take steps to dispose. 26o That distinction is crucial 
because while it is difficult to say that Shell intended to dispose of 
hazardous substances at B&B, it is not so implausible to say that 
Shell intentionally took steps that resulted in a disposal at B&B. 
As a first step in understanding what intent the Court referred to, 
the Court made it clear that not all arrangements that result in 
disposal are arrangements for disposal that bring § 9607(3) 
liability. 261 The Court cited two cases for the proposition that courts 
must look beyond how the parties characterize their transaction to 
determine "whether the arrangement was one Congress intended to 
fall within the scope of CERCLA's strict liability provisions": 
Freeman and Pneumo. 262 In both cases, the courts looked to the 
intent of the parties to determine whether the arrangement was one 
that should be subject to liability. 263 In both cases, the courts 
examined what was being transferred as a key to understanding the 
intent of the parties. 264 If the item was waste, the arrangement would 
be an arrangement for disposal. 265 If the subject of the transaction 
was a useful product, no liability could attach. 266 
These cases suggest that the Court was being precise in requiring 
intent to take steps toward disposal. Intent to dispose would be 
sufficient, but is not necessary. If the intent was not disposal, but 
instead the intent was to engage in a transaction that the court finds 
(by examining all of the circumstances) to be essentially a disposal, 
that would also bring liability. 267 
260. See, e.g., id. at 1879-80. 
261. See id. at 1878. 
262. Id. at 1879 (citing Freeman v. Glaxo Wellcome, Inc., 189 F.3d 160, 164 (2d Cir. 
1999); Pneumo Abex Corp. v. High Point, Thomasville & Denton R.R., 142 F.3d 769, 
775 (4th Cir. 1998)). 
263. Freeman, 189 F.3d at 164; Pneuma, 142 F.3d at 775. 
264. Freeman, 189 F.3d at 164; Pneuma, 142 F.3d at 775. 
265. See Freeman, 189 F.3d at 164 (noting that the chemicals in question were not waste at 
the time of the transaction); Pneuma, 142 F.3d at 775-76 (noting that the used wheel 
bearings were a "valuable product"). 
266. See Freeman, 189 F.3d at 164; Pneuma, 142 F.3d at 775-76. 
267. Freeman, 189 F .3d at 164 (discussing the circumstances that courts will consider in 
determining whether a transaction constitutes a disposal); Pneuma, 142 F.3d at 775 
(providing the factors courts apply to determine whether a transaction is for disposal). 
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The Court's response to the Government's argument about disposal 
supports the conclusion that intent to take steps toward disposal is the 
key. The Government argued that disposal can occur accidentally, 
and therefore, one can arrange for disposal accidentally.268 The Court 
responded by focusing on the "ultimate purpose of the 
arrangement.,,269 The question is not what happened, but what was 
"planned for.,,270 Thus, the Court was being precise in addressing the 
nature of the arrangement (i.e. was it an intentional step toward 
disposal) rather than focusing on what actually occurred (i.e. was 
there a disposal). If the nature of the arrangement is one the court 
deems to be a disposal, the defendant will have liability. 271 
C. Burlington Northern: Generator or Cause? 
Does the Burlington Northern Court adopt the view of arranger 
liability that is built on generator liability, the view based on 
causation, or something else? At first glance, one would have to say 
something else. The Court examined the word arrange and 
concluded that it contains a required element of intent.272 Neither 
generator liability, nor causation liability, contain a required element 
of intent. 273 
A good case can be made that the generator theory, or significant 
portions of that theory, survived because the Court indicated that the 
subject matter of the transaction is a major factor in determining the 
real intent of the transaction. 274 CERCLA adopts the RCRA 
definition of hazardous waste. 275 A major component of that 
definition is that waste is something to be discarded. 276 It may be that 
regardless of what one claims to be doing, any transaction the subject 
of which is an item to be discarded is an arrangement for disposaL 
This is the core of the generator theory-every generator is an 
268. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1870, 1880 (2009). 
269. Id. 
270. See id. at 1880. 
271. See id. at 1878-80. 
272. Id. at 1879. 
273. Compare supra note 20 and accompanying text (discussing the requirements of 
generator liability under RCRA), with supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text 
(discussing the imposition of strict liability on those who cause contamination). 
274. See Burlington N., 129 S. Ct. at 1880. 
275. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (2006) (defining "hazardous substance" in CERCLA 
in part by reference to RCRA's characterization of hazardous waste), and 42 U.S.C. § 
6921(b)(I) (linking RCRA's characterization of hazardous waste to the definition of 
"hazardous waste"), with 42 U.S.C. § 6903(5) (2006) (defining "hazardous waste"). 
276. See § 6903(5). 
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arranger because the only thing one can do with hazardous waste is 
arrange for its disposaL 277 
Causation theory, on the other hand, has a hard time surviving this 
decision. Shell's method of delivery was the cause of the disposal. 278 
Of course, the Court recognized that Shell had provided guidance to 
purchasers to reduce spillage and thus had demonstrated that they did 
not intend the spillage.279 Shell did, however, choose a method of 
delivery that produced spillage (tankers instead of drums) because it 
was less expensive. 280 Thus, their actions were the cause of the 
spillage,281 and their actions were not an arrangement for disposaL 282 
D. Where Does that Leave Aceto? 
At first glance, the intent issue appears to be fatal to the Aceto 
line. 283 The Court required intent, at least to the extent that one must 
intend to engage in a transaction whose purpose is to dispose of or 
discard a hazardous substance. 284 The Aceto defendants intended a 
transaction that may have had an element of generation and disposal 
of hazardous waste. 285 That disposal of waste was at best an 
unintended byproduct of a transaction whose purpose had nothing to 
do with waste. 286 However, because the Burlington Northern Court 
said that intent can be inferred from the totality of the circumstances, 
we will need to examine the totality of circumstances to see if this 
intent problem can be overcome. 287 
Justice Ginsburg, dissenting in Burlington Northern, can be seen as 
suggesting that Aceto lives. 288 She noted that, at oral argument, 
counsel for Shell was asked whether different shipping terms could 
have meant that Shell would have been the owner at the time the 
product was spilled. 289 Counsel responded yes.290 Based on that, the 
dissent argued that there should be liability because the shipping 
277. See Gershonowitz, supra note 49, at 154. 
278. Burlington N, 129 S. Ct. at 1875. 
279. Jd. at 1880. 
280. Jd. at 1885 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
281. See id. at 1875 n.1 (majority opinion). 
282. Jd. at 1880. 
283. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
284. Burlington N, 129 S. Ct. at 1879-80. 
285. See United States v. Aceto Agric. Cherns. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1383 (8th Cir. 1989). 
286. See id. at 1376. 
287. See Burlington N, 129 S. Ct. at 1879-80. 
288. See id. at 1885 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
289. Jd. at 1885 n.2. 
290. Jd. 
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tenns should not be the detennining factor in arranger liability. 291 
Underlying the dissent's reasoning is the assumption that if Shell 
owned the hazardous substances at the time the substances spilled, 
Shell would have been liable. 292 That premise is based on, or at least 
consistent with, Aceto, where ownership was a very important 
factor. 293 
The dissent's assumption that ownership would make a difference 
is not supported by the Court's opinion. 294 The Court said that courts 
should examine the purpose of the transaction to detennine whether 
the defendant had the requisite intent. 295 The purpose of the 
transaction does not change based on ownership of the hazardous 
substances. 296 The Court made clear that intent of the parties to the 
transaction . is important to detennining whether there is an 
arrangement for disposal. Intent of the parties does change with a 
change in ownership. 297 
Ownership goes to the issue of control, which goes to the issue of 
whether a defendant can be liable as someone who is ultimately 
responsible for the waste disposal. 298 Ownership is important, 
therefore, only if the causation theory of arranger liability survived. 299 
However, there is nothing in the Court's opinion that would suggest 
that arranger liability is based on the causation or responsibility 
concept. 
Thus, the Second Circuit's understanding of Aceto in the AAMCO 
decision30o could not have survived. The Second Circuit understood 
Aceto to be based on traditional concepts of duty. 301 In Burlington 
Northern, there is no discussion of duty. 302 Indeed, one could have 
argued that Shell had a duty to take additional steps to prevent the 
spillage. Instead, the Court focused on whether Shell made a plan for 
291. Id. Shipping terms could only be relevant if the dissent believed that ownership of the 
material would change the result. See id. 
292. See id. 
293. See United States v. Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 892 F.2d 1373, 1381 (8th Cir. 1989). 
294. See Burlington N., 129 S. Ct. at 1879-80. 
295. Jd. 
296. See id. 
297. See id. 
298. See id. 
299. See United States v. Shell Oil Co., 281 F.3d 812,822-23 (9th Cir. 2002). 
300. See supra Part II.B. 
301. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. AAMCO Transmissions, Inc., 962 F.2d 281, 286-87 (2d Cir. 
1992). 
302. See Burlington N., 129 S. Ct. 1870. 
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or intended the spillage. 303 The nature of the transaction is one of the 
factors to be examined to determine intent. If waste is the subject of 
the transaction, that could imply intent to dispose. 304 
We noted above, however, that portions of the Aceto decision make 
Aceto look like a generator case. 305 The Aceto court reasoned that the 
Aceto defendants should be liable just as the NEP A CCO defendants 
were liable. 306 In NEPACCO, the court reasoned that as generator, 
the defendant had control of the waste, and that control, prior to 
disposal, implied an arrangement for disposal. 307 The Eighth Circuit 
in Aceto reasoned that ownership and control of the process that 
generated the waste made the defendants de facto generators of that 
waste. 308 As noted above, the Sixth Circuit in GenCorp and the 
Eleventh Circuit in Montalvo understood Aceto as essentially a 
generator case. 309 That leaves open the possibility that those cases 
that rely on Aceto_could have survived. A court could examine the 
Aceto fact pattern and conclude that by engaging in a transaction that 
they knew would generate hazardous waste and would have to be 
disposed of as part of the transaction, the defendants took intentional 
steps to dispose of hazardous substances. 310 
Does the complexity of the transaction prevent that interpretation? 
The Burlington Northern Court was a little unclear on this point, 
perhaps because the transaction at issue could not be interpreted as 
other than a sale.3Il The Court stated that, "knowledge alone is 
insufficient to prove that an entity 'planned for' the disposal, 
particularly when the disposal occurs as a peripheral result of the 
legitimate sale of an unused, useful prodUCt.,,312 One could argue that 
disposal in Aceto was also a peripheral result of a legitimate non-
waste related transaction. On the other hand, the Aceto transaction 
included much more than a sale. 313 The defendants provided 
chemicals and instructions for formulation and received a finished 
product. 314 Generation and disposal of waste were necessary parts of 
303. Id. at 1880. 
304. See id. at 1878-79. 
305. See supra Part II.A. 
306. United States v. Aceto Agric. Cherns. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1381-82 (8th Cir. 1989). 
307. United States v. Ne. Pharm. & Chern. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 743-44 (8th Cir. 1986). 
308. Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1383-84. 
309. See supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
310. SeeAceto,872F.2dat1381. 
311. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1870, 1880 (2009). 
312. Id. 
313. Aceto, 872 F.2d 1373. 
314. Id. at 1375. 
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the transaction. 315 If generation and disposal of waste were 
necessary, maybe they were not peripheral, and a court could 
conclude that the defendants in Aceto planned for the disposal. 
How subsequent courts deal with the issue of what is "peripheral" 
will play an important role in determining the impact of the 
Burlington Northern decision. The Burlington Northern Court did 
not explain whether the spillage was peripheral because the entire 
transaction could be completed without any spillage or because the 
transaction was essentially a sale. The Court did say, however, that 
"to qualify as an arranger, Shell must have entered into the sale of D-
D with the intention that at least a portion of the product be disposed 
of during the transfer.,,316 That suggests that peripheral does not rely 
on what the essence of the transaction is. 
The Burlington Northern Court discussed the efforts made by Shell 
to reduce spillage. The Court inferred from those facts that Shell did 
not intend the spillage. 317 That could mean that a defendant in an 
Aceto-type case could reduce the likelihood of liability by giving the 
formulator instructions to avoid the accidental disposal of hazardous 
waste. 318 If so, the advice counsel has been providing may change. 
Many have counseled clients not to get involved in other people's 
waste handling matters because anything one does can lead to an 
inference of control and control can result in liability.319 Now, 
control is no longer a key to arranger liability, but intent is, and 
actions taken to avoid disposal will indicate that disposal was not 
intended and thereby reduce the likelihood of liability. 320 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court has provided clear guidance regarding arranger 
liability for sellers of useful non-waste products. 321 Its reasoning, by 
focusing on intent, is a clear rejection of some of the appellate 
arranger decisions that had addressed transactions other than the sale 
of a useful product. 322 Whether the Aceto line or any portion of it can 
survive, however, depends to a large extent on a number of issues left 
open by the Court, particularly what intent will satisfy the intent 
315. Id. at 1376. 
316. BurlingtonN., 129 S. Ct. at 1880. 
317. Id. 
318. See id. 
319. See Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1379. 
320. Burlington N., 129 S. Ct. at 1879. 
321. See id. at 1878-79. 
322. Compare, e.g., id. at 1880, with Aceto, 872 F.2d 1373. 
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requirement and how subsequent decisions determine what is 
"peripheral" to a transaction. 
